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I. Introduction
The market power versus efficiency debate in indus-
trial organization is well known. Proponents of the mar-
ket power argument attribute the positive correlation 
between market concentration and profitability to col-
lusion. Proponents of the efficiency argument assert the 
correlation reflects the superior efficiency of large firms. 
So, the causal direction is not from market power to 
higher profits, but from efficiency to higher profits and 
higher concentration (Demsetz, 1973). 
Until recently, the predominant approach to resolve 
the conflicting interpretations has been to use cross-in-
dustry samples, and include both market share and con-
centration as determinants of firm profits.1 The presence 
of efficiency is taken to be associated with a positive and 
significant market share effect, that of collusion with a 
positive and significant concentration effect. 
The approach has several limitations. First, how 
the two effects are exactly linked to profits is not clear 
from the regression. Second, even if one subscribes to 
the implied efficiency effect of market share, and to the 
implied collusion effect of concentration, when mar-
ket share of the larger firms is highly correlated with 
concentration, it is difficult to discriminate between 
the collusion and efficiency hypotheses (Philips, 1976; 
Kwoka, 1979; Clarke et al. 1984). Third, as Kardasz and 
Stollery (1995) have shown, in samples dominated by 
small firms, a negative coefficient on concentration 
supports rather than refutes the collusion hypothe-
sis. Fourth, regression estimates of the two effects are 
not helpful in answering the fundamental question re-
garding the profitability–concentration relation. That 
is, how much of the correlation is due to efficiency and 
how much is due to collusion? Fifth, treatment of con-
centration as an exogenous variable does not accom-
modate the hypothesized link from greater efficiency 
to higher concentration. 
Two tests which circumvent some of the limitations 
have recently been conducted at the single-industry 
level. Using estimates from a Bresnahan (1982) type con-
jectural oligopoly model, Rosenbaum (1994) inferred 
efficiency and collusion in the cement industry from 
changes over the sample period in marginal costs and 
price-cost margins, respectively. Azzam (1997) used a 
framework similar to Appelbaum’s (1982) to separate 
the market-power effect of increased concentration in 
the beef-packing industry from its cost-efficiency effect. 
Unlike Rosenbaum, Azzam formally linked the collu-
sion and efficiency components to industry concentra-
tion. However, neither study considered the link from 
efficiency to concentration. 
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In this paper the link from concentration to collu-
sion and efficiency, and the link from efficiency to con-
centration are formalized. In so doing, a way to testing 
Williamson’s (1968) policy tradeoffs, and Demsetz’s ef-
ficiency hypothesis is provided. The framework is a hy-
brid of Azzam’s procedure for separating the market 
power effect from the cost-efficiency effect of industrial 
concentration, and Clarke and Davies’ (1982) work on 
the joint determination of structure and performance. 
The paper is in six sections. The next section briefly 
describes the portland cement industry which is used 
for empirical analysis. The theoretical model is devel-
oped in the third section. The model explicitly identi-
fies the concentration-related market power and market 
efficiency components of price. It also creates a link be-
tween firm differential efficiency and market concentra-
tion. Section IV describes the empirical approximation 
of the theoretical model and discusses the data. Results 
are presented in Section V. These results unambigu-
ously show that rising market power raises price while 
rising efficiency lowers price. The market power effect, 
however, is twice the magnitude of the efficiency effect. 
Hence, overall, increases in concentration increase price. 
The results also show that concentration is an increasing 
function of the variance in costs across firms in the mar-
ket. The greater the cost variance, the more larger firms 
benefit at the expense of smaller firms and the higher 
the market concentration. 
II. The Portland Cement Industry
Portland cement is a homogeneous producer good. 
Given its low ratio of value to weight, it is shipped lim-
ited distances.2 Consequently, the US supply of portland 
cement can be divided into a number of regional mar-
kets. Regional markets tend to have a limited number of 
suppliers. Buying patterns tend to exhibit frequent sales. 
Many firms are interconnected across regional markets. 
Previous studies have found evidence of behaviors con-
sistent with tacit collusion in this industry.3
The portland cement production technology uses cal-
cium carbonate rock which is crushed and then com-
bined with lime and sand for grinding. Once ground, 
the raw materials are fed into a kiln where intense 
heat causes chemical changes in the composition of the 
feed stock. Kiln output, clinker, is then combined with 
gypsum and ground again. The end result is portland 
cement. 
There are essentially five variable inputs into cement 
production: labor; fuel (predominantly coal or natural 
gas) which is used to heat the kiln and is the primary in-
put expense; electricity, used to operate related auxiliary 
equipment; feed stocks; and maintenance. Furthermore, 
as variable inputs are not substitutable, the process ex-
hibits a fixed factor production function. Marginal costs 
do vary across kilns, however, based on respective tech-
nologies, capacities and ages. 
Portland cement is predominantly used in construc-
tion. Over the period 1978–1982, approximately 65% of 
sales were for building construction, 31% for highway 
construction, and less than 5% went towards noncon-
struction activities.4 The demand for cement should be 
fairly inelastic since there are few substitutes and its cost 
makes up a moderate part of most construction projects. 
Note that asphalt is an alternative for some highway 
construction applications. 
III. The Model
The starting point of the model is an industry consisting 
of N firms producing a homogeneous output Q, and fac-
ing the inverse demand function
p = p(Q, Z)                                    (1)
where p is price, and Z is a vector of demand shifters. 
Assuming the objective of the jth firm is to maximize 
profits
pqj – Cj(qj, ν) – F                             (2)
where Cj is total cost, and ν is a vector of factor prices, 
then that firm’s supply relation is
p = qj(1 + θj)/Qη²  + cj(qj, ν)                    (3)




 (dqi/dqj) is the jth firm’s conjectural variation, and cj(qj, 
ν) is marginal cost. 
If, as in Azzam, the jth firm’s cost function is assumed 
to take the Generalized Leontief (GL) (Diewert, 1971) 
functional form
 (4)
and all firms hold identical conjectures, multiplying 
both sides of Equation 3 by qj/Q and summing over the 
N firms yields the industry supply relation
 (5)
2 In 1977, for instance, 82.5% of all shipments were within a radius of 200 miles, 99.8% were for distances shorter than 500 miles (US Department of 
Commerce, 1977). 
3 See, for example, Rosenbaum (1994) or Jans and Rosenbaum (1996). 
4 Portland Cement Association (1984). 
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where H = ∑j (qj/Q)2 is the Herfindahl Index and θ is the 
industry conjectural variation. Equation 5 states that, in 
equilibrium, output price is the sum of two components: 
an oligopoly component, as measured by the first term 
on the right hand side, and a marginal cost component, 
as measured by the last two terms. For a given H and η 
the magnitude of the oligopoly component depends on 
the type of oligopolistic behavior. The simplest type is 
Cournot. In this case θ = 0. The benchmark for an indus-
try that is more competitive than Cournot is between 
zero and –1, where a value of –1 implies price-taking be-
havior. The benchmark for one that is less competitive 
than Cournot is between 0 and the joint-profit maximiz-
ing value 1/H – 1. Solving for the jth firm’s market share 
from Equation 3 yields
 (6)
Following Clarke and Davies, summing Equation 6 
over N, solving for p, substituting p back into Equation 
6 and summing its square yields the Herfindahl Index 
equation
 (7)
where N is the number of firms in the industry, and σc
2 is 
the coefficient of variation of marginal costs. Assuming 
the demand Equation 1 takes the semilogarithmic form
 (8)
the estimating model consists of Equations 5, 7 and 8. 
The tradeoff between concentration-induced market 
power effects and cost-efficiency effects on price may be 
measured with a constant or variable θ. If θ is assumed 
constant, differentiation of Equation 5 with respect to H, 
yields
 (9)
Alternatively, if conduct is influenced by market con-
centration, as maintained in this paper, i.e., θ = θ(H), the 
derivative becomes
 (10)
where the first term in both Equation 9 and Equation 10 
is the concentration-market-power effect, and the second 
is the concentration-cost-efficiency effect. Finally, differ-
entiation of Equation 7 with respect to σc
2 gives the effect 
of differential efficiency on concentration. The point es-
timate and standard error of the respective effects can 
be obtained using the econometric estimates from the 
joint model.
IV. Empirical Application
Assuming the conduct parameter θ is a linear function of 
the Herfindahl index (Rosenbaum), the empirical coun-





The θ’s, ’s, and d’s are parameters to be estimated, 
and the e’s are error terms. In Equation 11, the variables 
rprice, rpelec, rpfuel, rwage, and shipment are respec-
tively, the real price of cement, the real price of electric-
ity, the real price of fuel, the real hourly wage adjusted 
for productivity, and quantity of cement shipped. Note 
that the fixed proportions assumption leads to no cross 
products on the input prices for the cost part of Equa-
tion 11. In Equation 12, the variable nfirm represents 
the number of firms, and varcost the variance in costs 
across firms. In the demand Equation 13, rhwy, rnhwy, 
and rpasph are, respectively, real highway construction 
expenditures, real nonhighway construction expendi-
tures, and the real price of asphalt . Precise definition 
of the variables and their sources are in the Appendix. 
Mean, minimum, and maximum values of variables are 
shown in Table 1. 
Using Equation 10, and denoting by mpe the mar-
ket power effect, and by efe the cost-efficiency effect, we 
now have
Table 1. Means and ranges for variables used in estimation, N 
= 321
Variable              Mean              Minimum          Maximum
rprice  50.803  29.384  73.842
herf  0.2615  0.0773  1.000
shipment  3226.82  668.48  8025.20
nfirm  6  1  15
rpelec  12.9962  2.3002  21.240
rpfuel  2.0617  1.1651  2.9675
rwage  0.1169  0.0629  0.1708
rhwy  1760.06  6.0024  757.6888
rnhwy  3.7472  265.3200  757.6888
rpasph  3.7472  2.4728  5.8504
varcost  43327.95  0  278,784.0
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 (14)
and
efc = 2shipment(β1rpelec + β2rpfuel + β3rwage)        (15)
From Equation 7, the differential efficiency effect (dee) is
 (16)
V. Results
Results of the analysis are shown in Table 2. The first 
group of parameters is for the price equation. The first 
two parameters in this group are used to form θ, the con-
jectural variation measure. Results for the linear specifi-
cation are θ = 31.492 – 32.475 herf. The mean conjectural 
variation is about 23 and is highly significant. The con-
jectural variation is also statistically greater than zero for 
all values of the Herfindahl Index below 0.90. This holds 
for all but two observations in the sample. Apparently 
conjectures are more collusive than Cournot. 
The ′ik’s and β′i’s in Table 2 form the marginal cost 
part of the price equation. Only β1 is statistically signif-
icant by itself. However, since the industry marginal 
cost function is a complex aggregation of the underly-
ing firm-level marginal cost functions, it is difficult to 
exactly interpret the meaning of these parameters. Pa-
rameter estimates do suggest that marginal costs are un-
ambiguously increasing in fuel costs.5 Since fuel is the 
predominant input, this result is reassuring. 
The second group of parameters in Table 2 is for the 
demand equation. These results are more easily inter-
preted. Demand is downward sloping in price. The pa-
rameter d1 is the semidemand-elasticity. (Recall that d1 
= (dQ/dP) × (1/Q)). If the full elasticity is calculated by 
multiplying d1 by the mean of price, the resulting elas-
ticity is 0.45, well in the inelastic range. This is a reason-
able result. Demand is increasing in both highway and 
nonhighway construction expenditures. It is decreas-
ing in the price for the substitute input, asphalt. This fi-
nal result is contrary to expectation. However, as Rosen-
baum points out, the price of asphalt may be proxying 
for general fuel costs. 
The bottom part of the Table 2 contains the results 
that are the main focus of this analysis. The Market-
Power Effect, mpe, measures the impact that concentra-
tion-induced changes in market power have on price. 
This effect is positive and significant. When concentra-
tion (as measured by the Herfindahl Index) increases, 
prices will increase as a result of the implied increase in 
market power. The coefficient on mpe is 1810. Multiply-
ing by herf/rprice when both are evaluated at their mean 
values gives an approximation of an elasticity that mea-
sures relative changes in price associated with relative 
changes in market power. This elasticity is roughly 9.0, 
suggesting that every 1% increase in the Herfindahl In-
dex increases prices by about 9% due to changes in mar-
ket power. 
The Cost Efficiency Effect, efe, measures the impact 
that concentration-induced changes in efficiency have 
5 The derivative of marginal cost with respect to the price of input i is ∂cj/∂νi = ii + 2HQβi . 
Table 2. Summary of model estimates and standard errors
Item                                            Parameter                          Estimate           Standard error
Price equation:  θ0  31.492
a  9.422
 θ1  –32.475
a  9.558
 11  0.186  5.984
 22  –117.317  111.622
 33  –1160.360  1511.5
 β1  –0.014
b  0.005
 β2  0.105  0.092
 β3  –1.521  1.189
Mean conjectural variation:  θ = θ0 + θ1herf  22.999a  6.934
Demand equation:  d0  8.803a  0.130
 d1  –0.009a  0.002
 d2  0.0004a  0.0001
 d3  0.00004a  0.00001
 d4  –0.094a  0.0189
Market-power effect:  mpe  1809.59a  33.701
Cost-efficiency effect:  efe  –908.499a  124.022
Total effect:  mpe + efe  901.091  128.902
Efficiency-concentration effect:  dee  8E – 7a  5E – 8
Notes:    a = Statistically significant at the 99% level. 
              b = Statistically significant at the 95% level.
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on price. This effect is negative and significant. When 
concentration increases, prices decrease as a result of the 
implied greater production efficiency. This result is rea-
sonable in cement markets since larger firms are associ-
ated with larger kilns which benefit from economies of 
scale and more efficient technologies. The coefficient on 
efe is –908. Multiplying by the mean of herf/price gives 
an elasticity that measures relative changes in price as-
sociated with relative changes in cost efficiency. The 
elasticity equals –4.5; suggesting that every 1% increase 
in the Herfindahl Index decreases prices by about 4.5% 
due to increases in market efficiency. 
Comparing the two impacts, the efficiency effect is 
about half as great as the market power effect. Combin-
ing the efficiency and market power effects, the overall 
coefficient of change in price with a change in the Herfin-
dahl Index is 901 and statistically significant. The overall 
elasticity measuring the relative change in price associ-
ated with relative changes in the Herfindahl Index is 4.5. 
When the price lowering effects of increased efficiency are 
combined with the price rising effects of increased market 
power, the overall impact is that every 1% increase in the 
Herfindahl Index increases prices by about 4.5%.
The last estimate in Table 2 shows the differential ef-
ficiency effect. This measures the change in the Herfin-
dahl Index with a change in the variance in costs across 
firms in the market. The coefficient is positive and sta-
tistically significant, but it is fairly small at 8E–7. How-
ever, the elasticity at the mean is about 0.13, suggesting 
that a 7.7% increase in cost variance increases the Her-
findahl Index by 1%. Table 1 shows that the maximum 
of the cost variance measure is more than six times the 
mean. Hence, there can be fairly large disparities in cost 
variance across markets and, as a result, fairly large dis-
parities in concentration. 
VI . Conclusion
A persistent question in industrial economics is the 
underpinning of the link between market concentration 
and price. Does market power increase price or does 
market efficiency reduce it? This paper develops a the-
oretical model to examine that link. It advances a model 
that separates concentration into a market power com-
ponent and an efficiency component. The model is pa-
rameterized and applied to the US portland cement in-
dustry. The results indicate that both impacts matter. 
When changes in concentration enhance market power, 
it leads to higher prices. When changes in concentra-
tion enhance relative efficiency, it leads to lower prices. 
In relative terms, however, the market power effect is 
twice as large as the efficiency effect. Hence, when con-
centration increases, prices rise. These results will create 
a dilemma for merger policy. Apparently the beneficial 
efficiency effects of mergers are outweighed by the det-
rimental market power effects. 
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Appendix
The analysis examines data from 25 metropolitan 
markets over the period 1972 through 1989.6 Each of the 
metropolitan markets consists of a major metropolitan 
area and all Portland cement plants located within 200 
miles of the central city. 
The Portland Cement Association (PCA), in its Plant 
Information Summary, provides the following infor-
mation for practically all cement plants in the USA: 
plant location, the year when kilns at a plant were con-
structed, kiln capacity, and the technology used by each 
kiln. These data provide the basis for calculating most of 
the necessary variables. 
Price (rprice) The US Department of the Interior in its 
Minerals Yearbook publishes data on the value and vol-
ume of cement shipped, aggregated to either states or 
subregions of states. Dividing value by volume gives a 
transaction price. A market price is then calculated for 
each metropolitan market in each year by weighting the 
price in each state within the market by the percentage 
of the market’s capacity located in that state. The aver-
age price is then deflated by the Producer Price Index 
(PPI) with 1982 as a base year to obtain an estimate of 
the real transaction price per ton of cement.7
To obtain the capacity weights, data from the PCA’s 
Plant Information Summary are used. From these data 
(described above), the percentage of a market’s capac-
ity located within each state can be determined. These 
percentages become the weights in converting all state-
level data to market-level data. 
Shipments (shipment) The US Department of the Inte-
rior, in its Minerals Yearbook, also publishes data on kiln 
capacities by region. For each Minerals Yearbook region, 
the volume of shipments is divided by capacity to obtain 
a shipments-to-capacity ratio. The PCA data are then 
used to form metropolitan market shipment to capacity 
ratios. For each market, the Minerals Yearbook shipments-
to-capacity ratio is multiplied by the PCA market capac-
ity to get a measure of market shipments in millions of 
tons. Finally, imports are added to get total shipments. 
Real Highway Construction Expenditures (rhwy) 
Highway construction expenditures, in current dollars, 
for each metropolitan market can be obtained from the 
US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census’s 
City Government Finances. They are deflated by the PPI 
to obtain real values in millions of dollars. 
Real NonHighway Construction Expenditures (rn-
hwy) Nonhighway expenditures are the sum of residen-
tial and nonresidential, nonhighway construction ex-
penditures. Current dollar new residential construction 
expenditures, by city, are published by the US Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census in Housing 
Authorized by Building Permits and Public Contracts. Cur-
rent dollar nonresidential, nonhighway construction 
expenditures, by city, are published in the US Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census’s Construc-
tion Review. The two values are summed and deflated 
by the PPI to produce annual real values in millions of 
dollars. 
Real Price of Asphalt (rpasph) State-level asphalt 
prices, in dollars per million Btu, are obtained from the 
Energy Price and Expenditure Data Report published by 
the US Department of Energy. The state-level data are 
weighted by relative kiln capacities to get metropolitan 
market data. These are deflated by the PPI to get real 
values. 
Real Price of Electricity (rpelec) State-level electric-
ity prices for the industrial sector, in dollars per million 
Btu, are obtained from the Energy Price and Expenditure 
Data Report published by the US Department of Energy. 
The state-level data are weighted by relative kiln capac-
ities to get metropolitan market data. These are deflated 
by the PPI to get real values. 
Real Wage (rwage) State-level average hourly wages 
for nonsupervisory workers in all manufacturing in-
dustries are obtained from the US Department of La-
bor’s Employment Hours and Earnings. The metropolitan 
region real wage rate is derived by weighting the state 
level data by the share of the kiln capacity located in 
each state, then deflated by CPI. This real wage is ad-
justed by the national cement output index to reflect 
the change in the average productivity of labor over 
time. 
Real Price of Fuel (rpfuel) Cement manufacturers 
predominantly use either coal or natural gas as kiln fu-
els. In 1979, for example, 92.8% of fuel was either coal or 
natural gas (PCA, Energy Report, 1980). State-level prices 
for both coal and natural gas, in dollars per million Btu, 
are obtained from the Energy Price and Expenditure Data 
Report published by the US Department of Energy. They 
are then weighted by relative kiln capacities to get met-
ropolitan market data. The PCA’s Energy Report shows 
the yearly national relative use of coal and natural gas as 
kiln fuels. The metropolitan market prices for each type 
of fuel are weighted by their yearly respective uses to 
calculate fuel prices per million Btu. These are deflated 
by the PPI to get real values. 
6 The cities are Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Denver, Detroit, Kansas 
City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York City, Oklahoma City, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Salt 
Lake City and Seattle. 
7 The Producer Price Index data are from The Statistical Abstract of the United States (US Department of Commerce), various issues. 
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Herfindahl Index (herf) The Herfindahl Index is a ca-
pacity-based Herfindahl index. The capacity-based mar-
ket shares are derived from PCA Plant Information Sum-
mary data. 
Number of Firms (nfirm) This is the number of firms 
in a market in any particular year as measured from the 
PCA Plant Information Summary. 
Variance in Costs (varcost) Costs are assumed to vary 
as a function of kiln size. Larger kilns tend to be newer, 
benefit from scale economies and use more efficient 
technologies. The variance in costs is proxied by the 
variance in kiln size in a market in any particular year. 
Kiln sizes in millions of tons are obtained from the PCA 
Plant Information Summary. 
